How can the Baltic states be defended by hybrid threats?

This article was originally published in French

The recent damage to submarine telecommunications cables in the Baltic Sea connecting Germany with Finland and Lithuania with Sweden are both considered acts of sabotage, and have reminded us of the vulnerability of critical infrastructure to hybrid attacks.

Suspicion on who caused the damage is currently focused on Russia.

“For countries bordering the Baltic Sea, subsea infrastructure is extremely important, especially for countries on the eastern shore of the Baltic Sea, the Baltic States and Finland, because a large part of our data and energy infrastructure connections between all EU countries pass under the Baltic Sea: data cables, electric cables, gas pipelines,” Henrik Praks, an Estonia-based researcher at the International Centre for Security and Defence (ICDS), tells Euronews.

The stakes are indeed high. 90% of global digital communications data passes through submarine cables. Bordered by eight member states of the European Union, the Baltic Sea is a strategic area that remains vulnerable to hybrid attacks.

“The marine environment is governed by specific legal acts where the universal freedom of navigation deriving from the law of the sea offers coastal states very few real possibilities to arrest and pursue vessels, for example merchant ships, that would be involved in such illegal activity,” explains Praks.

Hybrid attacks

For its part, the European Council condemned the increase in hybrid activities led by Russia against the EU, including disinformation, cyberattacks, as well as the weaponisation of migration.

Disrupting Western societies and arousing fear in the population are the main goals of these hybrid attacks, claims Joris Van Bladel, a researcher at the Egmont Institute in Brussels.

“Why are they doing that? Because it’s cheaper for Russians. And they don’t have the means to wage direct war. It is therefore a very profitable type of interference,” Bladel explains to Euronews.

These techniques are not new. The Baltic countries have been subjected to Russian hybrid attacks since they achieved independence in the 1990s, says Ivars Ijabs, a Renew Europe MEP from Latvia. However, they have intensified in recent times.

In 2016, NATO declared that its member countries could invoke Article 5, which makes it possible to come to the aid of an attacked member if one or more were to be targeted by hybrid activities.

EU response

In May, the European Council approved a framework to coordinate the EU’s response to hybrid campaigns. In particular, it includes the deployment of rapid response teams in the event of hybrid threats.

During a debate at the European Parliament in Strasbourg in November, MEPs called for attention to be paid to the hybrid warfare tactics employed by Russia in Europe, and in particular in the Baltic Sea.

“I think that the EU should use its technological superiority. And that is why I am really happy that the European Commission is using money from the Connecting Europe Mechanism and investing in the development of new sensor cables that can quickly detect what is happening under the sea, because otherwise it will always be very easy for Russia to say it isn’t them,” Ijabs explains to Euronews.

Disincentives such as the closure of the Baltic Sea must be on the table, adds the Latvian MEP, though it would be a politically sensitive measure.

These hybrid attacks are, however, not limited to the Baltics. In 2023, around twenty Polish trains had their stop function triggered by a radio hack.