Authored by Rick Fisher via The Epoch Times,
While President Donald Trump’s ambition to control Denmark’s massive territory of Greenland has many strategic merits, it is also politically problematic and risks wasting scarce political capital that could be directed toward a far greater prize.
A far more decisive use of the administration’s three years of limited political capital would be to assemble a Greenland-to-Patagonia defense axis of cooperation that secures the Western Hemisphere from Russian and Chinese missile attack for generations to come.
The military-strategic value of Greenland to the defense of the United States—especially to the future of Trump’s “Golden Dome” national and allied missile defense program, as well as preventing Russia–China control of the Arctic—is undeniable.
When viewed from a Polar perspective of the Earth, Greenland offers an ideal location for long-range ground-based radar and ground-based missile interceptors to shoot down Russian and even some Chinese nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) before they cross the North Pole and enter Canadian and U.S. territory.
So far, both Denmark and the government of Greenland are not willing to sell their territory to the United States, while a 1951 U.S.–Denmark defense agreement grants the United States broad rights for defense-related construction.
Furthermore, the former Thule Air Base, now the U.S. Pituffik Space Base, on Greenland already provides critical warning of a Russian missile attack and helps enable U.S. superiority in space.
Pressing the issue risks a crisis.
Should it force the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to expel Washington, how long before Russia is tempted to escalate its aggression against Ukraine and then against Poland and the Baltic states?
Also possible would be an immediate Europe–Russia condominium that Russia and China would exploit by shifting significant Russian forces to support a Chinese attack on Taiwan, including the deployment of more Russian and Chinese forces to threaten key U.S. bases in Alaska, Seattle, and along the U.S. West Coast.
A far more productive use of U.S. political capital would be to enlist key NATO members, starting with Denmark and the UK, to expand the scope of the Golden Dome national missile defense by making Greenland part of a hemispheric defense network and engaging the major democracies of Patagonia—Argentina and Chile—to build early-warning and missile-interceptor bases on their territories to defend against Chinese missiles with South Polar trajectories.
In May 2025, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) released a rare future estimate of Chinese and Russian nuclear missile threats against the United States, underscoring the need for Trump’s Golden Dome initiative.
DIA predicted that by 2035, China would have 60 Fractional Orbital Bombardment Systems (FOBS) or nuclear missiles that achieve orbital altitude to exploit flight trajectories over the South Pole, in the expectation that southern approaches to U.S. targets will be less defended.
But there is a more profound future Chinese missile threat that would justify investment in a hemispheric missile defense capability, especially one that would justify the radar and missile reach attainable from Patagonian bases.
This is the quickly looming threat of weaponized Chinese reusable space launch vehicles (SLVs), now under development by about 15 Chinese state-owned and “commercial” SLV companies.
What these companies build and what they do is ultimately controlled by the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The commission controls the People’s Liberation Army’s Aerospace Force, which, in turn, controls all Chinese space activities.
A Long March-2F carrier rocket, carrying the Shenzhou-20 spacecraft and a crew of three astronauts, lifts off from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Centre in the Gobi desert, in northwest China, on April 24, 2025. Pedro Pardo/AFP via Getty Images
In December 2025, two Chinese SLV companies—LandSpace (commercial) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (state-owned)—tested their first reusable first-stage SLVs; both failed to recover for reuse, but further tests are expected this year.
In 2026, Chinese sources indicate that up to eight additional “commercial” Chinese SLV companies may begin testing reusable SLVs.
In addition, the PLA could order these Chinese SLV companies to develop SLV second stages capable of carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) nuclear warheads over Antarctica and into Latin America to attack the United States.
At least two Chinese SLV companies intend to develop first-stage reusable SLVs nearly as large as the U.S. SpaceX Corporation’s Starship—that could put payloads as large as 100 tons into Low Earth Orbit, or potentially very large space combat satellites armed with lasers or equipped to drop warheads.
Another threat is that the PLA will have access to enough reusable SLVs to conduct massive intercontinental strikes with non-nuclear missile warheads and Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) against the United States, NATO member countries, and other U.S. allies—a destabilizing prospect because China would be more tempted to use these weapons with a lower risk of nuclear retaliation.
It is in the interest of the defense of the United States and Europe that China not be able to exploit South Pole trajectory nuclear attack routes, just as it is in the interest of all Latin American states that Chinese nuclear or non-nuclear attack payloads not fly over or near their territories.
This highlights the need to engage Chile and Argentina to consider cooperation in building powerful long-range early warning radar and, if possible, missile defense bases on their territories that provide maximum coverage of potential Chinese missile routes over the east and west sides of Latin America.
It would also be advantageous to engage the UK on the construction of early warning systems and, if possible, missile defense sites in the Falkland Islands, which would provide coverage over a larger area of the South Atlantic and even Southern Africa.
On Jan. 9, China, Russia, and Iran began a third joint naval exercise with South Africa, an activity likely funded by China. Iran, in the midst of a serious economic and political crisis, was still able to send its largest warship.
The CCP has ambitions to expand its space cooperation in Africa, potentially building bases for Chinese reusable SLV companies that would have to obey military orders from the CCP and the PLA.
Initially, it is possible to conceive of the United States building large missile defense ships that could, with agreement, be stationed in Chilean, Argentine, and Falkland Islands ports, avoiding the requirement to build bases on their territories.
But even a minimal presence approach should also consider how to include participation from the military forces of at least Chile, Argentina, and the UK to jointly staff prospective missile defense facilities.
This, in turn, could open new opportunities for defense and space cooperation—all three are already signatories to the Artemis Accords, which promote transparent and peaceful behavior on the moon.
The prospect of greater “Patagonian” defense cooperation also offers the UK and Argentina opportunities to build greater confidence, which can facilitate economic cooperation across the greater Falklands area.
There is also greater hemispheric and U.S. interest in promoting a Falklands resolution process, inasmuch as China spent most of the last 15 years trying to sell leftist Peronist regimes in Argentina the weapons they would need to start a second Falklands War.
Promoting a hemispheric defense against current and future Chinese missile threats—and denying China trouble-making opportunities such as promoting a second Falklands War—can go far in dissuading Latin American states from granting the CCP and PLA any further access detrimental to hemispheric security.
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times or ZeroHedge.
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